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1. INTRODUCTION
There are two puzzling results in the empirical literature. The first is that either private consumption is
unchangedor rises in response to an unanticipated increase in governmentconsumption.The second
is that prices decline in response to the same shock. The behavior of consumption has deserved more
attention than the behavior of prices. The behavior of consumption, although, consistent with the
Keynesian multiplier theory, stands in stark contrast with the prediction of the standard real business
cycle (RBC) model. That is because in the standard RBC model an increase in government consump-
tion raises the present value of the stream of taxes over time whichgenerates a negative wealtheffect
that brings downprivate consumption. This predictionof the RBC model is describedin Christiano and
Eichenbaum (1992) and Baxter and King (1993), among others. The behavior of prices is even more
difficult to explain since with the shock, aggregate demand increases more than aggregate supply.
This pushes up prices.
A few explanations have been proposed for the behavior of private consumption but none for the be-
havior of the prices. To explain the behavior of consumption researchers were led to search for fea-
tures that could be introduced in the standard RBC model in order to account for the empirical finding
that private consumption responds positively to fiscal spending shocks. The few existing explanations
are very intricate. Rather than using a complex model, full of frictions, to explain the apparent puzzles
what we propose in this paper is a simple RBC model without capital but with three added features. All
these features are empirically relevant. First, we give money a role in transactions by introducing
cash-in-advance constraints for the agents, as in Lucas and Stockey (1987). Second, we assume that
monetarypolicyhasaliquidityeffect likeinFuerst (1992)andLucas(1990).Third, wesupposethat the
monetary authority reacts to government consumption innovations.
The first modification places the interest rate in the consumption-leisure margin. This gives the mone-
tary policy additional power to influence the economy. The second assumption makes the monetary
policy non-neutral. As agents choose their portfolio of assets in advance, unexpected changes in the
money supply change the interest rate. The third assumption allows the monetary policy to react to
shocks in the economy, in particular to government consumption shocks. Theory showsthat monetary
policy improves economic performance if it is used to respond to shocks.
It has been thought that there cannot be a positive response in private consumption to government
consumption shocks as long as monetary policy is conducted in a reasonable manner. The common
wisdom has been that the reasonable monetary policy will amplify the private consumption response.
The government shock will create inflationary pressures and the anti-inflationary central bank will in-
crease the interest rate in order to control inflation expectations. Thus, in that way it will decrease fur-
ther the private consumption. To obtain the reverse result it would be necessary that the monetary
Economic Bulletin | Banco de Portugal
Articles | Spring 2006
3
* The views expressed in this paper are of the authors and not necessarily those of Banco de Portugal.We would like to thank Isabel Correia for helpful
conversations and José Ferreira Machado and João Sousa for comments on an earlier version of the paper.
** Departamento de Estudos Económicos.policy be specified so that the central bank wouldreact by increasing the money supply in response to
a government consumption shock. In doing that the central bank would be, due to the rigidity in the
adjustment of portfolios, varying the interest rate, decreasing it.
In the contextof a simpleRBC modelwitha cash in advanceconstraintfor privateconsumption,a pos-
itive government consumption shock has a negative income effect that decreases both consumption
andleisure.If moneysupplyisunchanged,fromthecashinadvanceconstraintweobtainthattheprice
level must increase. An active central bank that has as one of its main objectives to maintain price sta-
bility will react to this shock by using the instruments at its disposal to counteract the effects of this
shock over the prices. In the context of our model in order for the prices to decrease the central bank
must decrease the interest rate.
Sincewedonothaveanya priorior anyhardevidenceonhowthecentralbankreacts to a government
consumptionshock,wetakethismattertothedatabyconductingourownempiricalanalysisinastruc-
tural VAR framework. We allow the monetary policy to react contemporaneously to the government
consumption shock and to all past variables. It is important to allow the monetary policy to react con-
temporaneouslyto the shock because, otherwisethe central bank willnot be able to counteract the ef-
fect of the shock over the current prices. As it turns out, we estimate that a positive government
consumption shock triggers an accommodating reaction by the monetary authorities, the real money
supply rises and the nominal interest rate decreases. In the context of our model, that affects the con-
sumption-leisure margin in such a way that an increase in private consumption and a decrease in lei-
sure of private individuals is possible. As a consequence output goes up. Moreover, the interest rate
reaction to the shock has an effect over the price level that is of the opposite sign to the one generated
by the government shock, prices drop. This explains why a central bank that has the incumbency of
maintaining price stability might want to have an expansionary policy in response to a positive
government shock.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the results in the literature, section 3
describes the empirical evidence obtained by us, section 4 explains the effects of the government
shock in the context of the model and section 5 concludes. In the end there are two appendices that
give additional details of the empirical results and of the model.
2. LITERATURE
As already referred much of the evidence in the literature concerns the behavior of consumption. Evi-
dence about prices can be obtained from Edelberg, Eichenbaum and Fisher (1999), Fatás and Mihov
(2001) and Mountford and Uhlig (2002). They find a negative response of prices to the government
shock. The evidence on private consumption suggests that either private consumption is unchanged
or rises in responseto an unanticipated increasein governmentconsumption.Some of the evidenceis
obtainedfrom structuralvectorautoregressive(VAR)models.BlanchardandPerotti(2002),Fatás and
Mihov (2001) and Gali et al (2004) identify exogenous shocks to government consumption by assum-
ing that this variable is predetermined with respect to the other variables. They find that private con-
sumption rises significantlyand persistentlyafter an unanticipated increase in government purchases.
In the same methodological vein, Perotti (2004) finds that this result is pretty robust to a sample of five
OECD countries.Mountford andUhlig(2002)employinga different identificationmethodobtainsimilar
results.
There is also other type of evidence, besides that obtained from VARs. Perotti (1999) studies the
comovementof privateconsumptionandgovernmentconsumptionandfindsoutthat onlyduringfiscal
consolidation episodes, characterized by large spending cuts, private consumption and output rise,
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4but in all other experiences the opposite happens, private consumption moves together with govern-
ment consumption. Others, like Edelberg, Eichenbaumand Fisher (1999), and Burnside, Eichenbaum
and Fisher (2003) use additional information such as timing of wars to identify the fiscal policy shock.
They reach the conclusion that the fiscal policy has no noticeable impact on private consumption.
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Edelberg, Eichenbaum and Fisher (1999) find a small and delayed fall in the consumption of
nondurablesand services, though durables consumption increases on impact. Burnside, Eichenbaum
and Fisher (2003) find a flat response of aggregate consumption in the short run, followed by a small
(and insignificant) rise in that variable several quarters after the shock.
Researchers either have not been able or have not been willing to explain the behavior of prices, but
there have been attempts to understand the behavior of consumption. As the standard RBC model is
notableto explainthebehaviorconsumption,researcherswereledto searchfor featuresthatcouldbe
introduced in the standard RBC model in order to account for the empirical finding that private con-
sumption responds positively to fiscal spending shocks. Linnemann and Schabert (2003) consider a
sticky price model where government consumption provides utility to households. Private consump-
tion is crowdedin by a positive government consumption shock as long as the elasticity of substitution
between the private and the public good is sufficiently small. Devereux, Head and Lapham (1996)
have a production function of the final good withconstant returns on the quantity employedof interme-
diate goods but increasing returns to an expansion of variety, holding constant the quantity employed
of each intermediate good. An increase in government consumption willcreate an opportunityfor prof-
its, inducing more firms to enter which will increase the variety of intermediate goods produced. If the
degree of increasing returns is sufficiently high the real wagewillincrease as wellas private consump-
tion. The negative wealth effect of increased taxation on households is more than offset by the in-
crease in factor productivity due to the entry of new firms. Gali, Lopez-Salido and Valles (2004) offers
an explanationfor the effects over private consumptionof a governmentspendingshock financedbya
deficit rather than current taxes. They modify substantially the RBC model by including non-Ricardian
rule-of-thumb consumers, which are consumers that consume all their available disposable income in
each period, and by assuming that employment is determined by firms alone. The labor market as-
sumption is there to make real wages increase significantly so that the wage income of the rule-o-
f-thumb consumers goes up after the shock. The rule-of-thumb consumers are necessary to ensure
that private consumption does not drop after a government consumption shock because of the wealth
effect.
3. EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE
In this section we describe our empirical analysis. Additional details are supplied in appendix 1. We do
a VAR andusethe traditionalidentificationprocedure.The onethat takesgovernmentconsumptionas
predetermined relative to the other variables in the VAR. In doing so, we use a longer sample, which
imparts addedrobustnessto the results. Moreover, weincludethe variablesmoneyand interest rate in
order to test empirically the predictions of our model.
3.1. Identification of the Government Expenditure Shock
In the context of structural VARs, Blanchard and Perotti (2002) developed a methodology to identify
fundamental government consumption shocks as well as their dynamic effects on a set of macroeco-
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(1) Rotemberg and Woodford (1992) consider an autoregressive model where innovations in military spending are treated as an exogenous shock that is
uncorrelated with any other shocks. They obtain that the responses of output, hours and real wage to a military spending shock are positive.nomic variables. Their identification strategy bears on the insight that the institutional framework that
liesbehindfiscalpolicydecisionsissuchthatpublicconsumptionisessentiallyexogenous.Inpractice,
this means assuming that government consumption is predetermined with respect to the other vari-
ables in the VAR. For our purposes, we follow the strategy of Blanchard and Perotti (2002) with an
added twist, needed to make our identification strategy consistent with the possibility that the central
bank may react to innovations in government consumption. So, apart from assuming that the govern-
ment consumption is predetermined relative to all the other variables in our VAR, we also impose the
supplementaryidentifyingrestrictionthat moneysupplyreacts contemporaneouslyonlyto shocks to it-
self and to government consumption. The reason for imposing that the money supply reacts contem-
poraneouslyonly to government consumption is to ensure that the response, on impact, of money to a
government consumption shock is being driven by that shock directly and not indirectly through the
dynamic response of the remaining variables in the VAR.
The analysis is based on the following reduced-form VAR,
 ZB L Z u E u u V tt t t t      1 ,
' (1)
where 	 ZG M Y C T P R W t t tt ttt t t 
 ,, ,, , ,, is the vector of the endogenousvariablescomprisingthe following
variables: real government consumption, real money supply, real GDP, real private consumption, real
net taxes, GDP deflator, nominal interest rate and real wage. is a vector of constants,BL () is a poly-
nomial of order q in the lag operator, L, and ut is the vector of the one-step-ahead forecast errors to
Zt with invariant variance matrixV.
3.2. Data Description
The statistical series used to measure the variablesin our VAR come in quarterlyfrequency, and cover
the period 1948:I-2004: III, which is the longest available sample for the United States. We took the
same definitions of government consumption and revenue as Blanchard and Perotti (2002). For gov-
ernment consumption (G) we took the item real government consumption consumption and gross in-
vestment from the National Income and Product Accounts (NIPA) tables of the Bureau of Economic
Analysis(BEA). The measurefor nominalnettaxesis definedas currentgovernmentreceipts lesscur-
rent transfer payments and interest payments. The real net taxes (T) were obtained by dividing the
nominal net taxes by the GDP deflator. The real GDP (Y) and GDP deflator (P) series were extracted
from the NIPAtables, BEA. The consumption variable (C), was taken from the item real personal con-
sumption expenditures of the NIPA tables, BEA. The real money supply (M) is the ratio between the
nominal money aggregate M1 and the GDP deflator. The M1 series was taken from the FRED data-
base of the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis in monthlyfrequencyand transformed into quarterlyse-
ries bysimpleaveraging.The variableR wasproxiedbythe secondarymarket yieldof the three-month
Treasury Bill as published by the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System. This series was
transformedfrom monthlyfrequencyintoquarterlyfrequencythroughsimpleaveraging.The realwage
variable(W)wascomputedbydividingthenominalhourlycompensationofthenon-farmbusinesssec-
tor published by the Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS), by the GDP deflator. Except for R which is ex-
pressed in levels, all variables are expressed in log levels and seasonally adjusted. All quantity
variables were normalized by the size of the working age population as measured by the series P16
published by the BLS.
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63.3. Impulse Responses
OurVARanalysisisconductedfortheperiod1949:I-2004:III,sincewehavetodropthefirst fourobser-
vationsto accountfor the fact that weset the VAR lag-lengthto four (q  4). The plots of the impulsere-
sponse to a government consumption shock are displayed in figure 1.These plots are similar to the
ones obtained by the empirical VAR literature.
All variables are measured in percentage deviations from the base line, except for R, which is mea-
sured in basis point deviations. The dashed lines correspond to 95% confidence bands constructed
using standard error estimates of impulse responses obtained from 2,000 bootstrap simulations.
The shock induces a significant and protracted rise in both government consumption and real GDP.
The government consumption multiplier on real GDP was estimated to be of 0.7 and 1.5 after one and
twoyears, respectively
2, values that are in line withBlanchard and Perotti (2002) and Gali et al (2004).
The results of figure 1 are compatible with the monetary authority accommodating the government
consumption shock by raising the money supply and decreasing the nominal interest rate. We do ob-
serve the puzzle reported in the literature, private consumption going up with the government con-
sumption shock. Finally, the response of prices to a government consumption shock is negative. The
deflation rate is bigger after the shock and converges to zero.
3
4. THE GOVERNMENT SHOCK
Inthissectionweproposeadynamicgeneralequilibriummodelwhichisdescribedinmoredetailinap-
pendix 2. We study whether the model can replicate the impulse responses obtained in the VAR and
shownin Figure 1. We are interestedin knowingif the modelcan deliverincreasesin private consump-
tion, output and money and decreases in interest rate and prices after a positive government con-
sumption shock. We assume that the economy is in its deterministic steady state when it receives a
positivetemporarygovernmentshockandthecentralbankrespondsbyincreasingthemoneysupply.
The model is a dynamic general equilibrium model with two cash in advance restrictions, one for the
households and one for the firms, with a friction to deliver money non-neutrality and without capital.
The friction considered is sticky portfolios. Government levies lump-sum taxes, injects money and
makes consumption expenditures. Households maximize expected utility




  0 0 1  , where is a discount factor, Ct is consumption, 1Nt is leisure and Nt is























,   00 , . Firms maximize profits. The production function is
YA N A tt  ,0 . All markets clear.
As the only friction present in the model economy is that the portfolios must be chosen one period in
advance, the economy is only one period outside the steady state. In order to get the persistence that
the responses show in the VAR and graphically represented in Figure 1 it would be necessary to in-
clude additional frictions.
4 Instead of following that route we opted for the less realistic, but perhaps
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(2) In these calculations we used the sample mean of the share ofG in Y, which is around 23%. 4422
(3) TheestimatedeffectoverconsumptionislargerthantheoneobtainedbyChristianoet.al.(2005)foramonetarypolicyshock.Therealwageincreasesaftera
few periods but it is not statistically significant. According to the model presented in section 4 the real wage should increase after the shock.
(4) For instance Gali et al (2004) are able to obtain persistence but need various frictions: monopolistic competition in the production of intermediate goods,
Calvo price setting, a monetary policy rule, a special rule for tax-setting, a special labor market assumption consistent with countercyclical mark-ups and
investment adjustment costs.Banco de Portugal | Economic Bulletin
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Figure 1



























































































1 6 11 16more instructive one, of considering a simple economy that is able to deliver the impact responses of
private consumption and prices observed in the data after a government consumption shock.
The shock occurs in periodT. The economy before the shock in periodT is in its deterministic steady
state and as it takes only one period to adjust. In periodT  1 the economy is back to the steady state.
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Equation (2) says that in the steady state the nominal interest rate,Rt is equal to the inverse of the dis-
count factor. Equation (3) is the condition that the real wagemust equal the marginal productivity of la-
bor. Equation (4) is derived from the condition that equates the intratemporal marginal rate of
substitution between leisure and consumption to the marginal rate of transformation. Equation (5) is a
feasibility condition. It says that private consumption is equal total production minus government con-
sumption. Finally, equation (6) reflects the fact that in the steady state there is neither inflation nor
wage increases.
We now concentrate on the effect of the shock on the variables of periodT. The relevant equations in
period T to determine the evolution of prices, output and consumption are the cash in advance con-
straint for the households
PC M TT T
S  (7)
and equations (4) and (5) for periodT. First, we consider the case in which the central bank does not
react to the government shock. The NT would remain constant according to (4), CT would decrease
from (5) and P T would increase by (7). Thus, if the central bank would not react to the government
shock prices would increase and consumption would decrease.
5
Now we assume that the central bank to maintain price stability is going to react to the shock. It can be
seen from (4) that if the value for  is sufficiently small then whenRT decreases,NT will increase sub-
stantially and more thanGT . From (5) whenNT increases more thanGT thenCT goes up.
It is trivial to show that the price level may go down in period T. The price level is given by (7).The
P T will fall ifCT increases by more than MT
S. It is clear from (5) that in order for that to happen the out-
put, ANT , must respond strongly to the shock inGT .
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(5) Inthiscaseoutputremainsconstantinresponsetotheshock.Thisisentirelyduetothefunctionalformchosenforthepreferences.Thepreferenceschosen
belong to a particular class of preferences, in which there are no income effects over the labor supply. For general preferences, the income effect of a
positive government shock is negative, so that labor supply increases.Finally, the intuition for the negative relationship between interest rate and money supply is simple.
Agents are willing to accept more money only if its opportunity cost, which is the nominal interest rate,
goes down. Aformal proof of this is given in appendix 2.
5. FINAL REMARKS
Past researchers have obtained evidence that indicates that a government consumption shock raises
output, does not decrease consumption and decreases prices. This evidence is difficult to reconcile
with the standard RBC model. In the standard RBC model a positive government consumption, no
matter how it is financed, leads to smaller consumption and higher prices. The literature has a few ex-
planations for that, we offer a different one. Our explanation was motivated by economic theory. Ac-
cording to theory the central bank should use the instruments at its disposal to respond to shocks. In
the context of an RBC model with a cash in advance and sticky portfolios the monetary authority can
counteract the effects of a positive government shock by increasing money supply.
We conduct a VAR analysis, as it is done in the literature, but with alternative variables and equations,
for a longer time span that confirms that a government consumption shock raises output and private
consumption, but also that the central bank reacts to the government consumption shock by increas-
ingmoneysupplyanddecreasingthe interest rate. The effect of the monetarypolicyover consumption
is of the opposite sign and dominates the initial effect of the government consumption shock. A RBC
model with portfolios chosen in advance is used to argue that this type of reaction by the central bank
can explain the behavior of consumption after a government consumption shock. The reaction of the
central bank is taken as exogenous,but it is coherent withthe objective alleged by manycentral banks
of maintaining inflation stable. Ceteris paribus, the government shock brings the price level up and to
offset that effect the centralpracticesan expansionarypolicy. The behaviorof the centralbankis in line
witheconomic theory, whichsays that monetary policy must react to shocks in the economy. However,
we do not attempt to verify if the central bank’s reaction function is optimal.
The impulseresponsesofthevariousvariablestothegovernmentconsumptionshockshowahighde-
gree of persistence that our simple model does not capture. To capture that persistence of the vari-
ables it would be necessary to include various type of frictions. That is the way it is done in the
literature. We decided that, at this time, it was not worthwhile to complicate the model so that it could
satisfy this feature of the evidence.
APPENDIX 1
In this appendix we describe additional details of the VAR. The VAR can alternatively be represented
by the structural form:
 AZ AL Z e tT t 01   . (8)
wherethe structural shocks,et, whichare unobservable,are assumed to be mutuallyindependentand
related linearly to the one-step-ahead forecast errors,ut:
uD eE e eI ttt t 
'
The parameters of the structural form are therefore linked to those of the reduced form by:
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10wherethefirst columnofD istheobjectweneedtoidentifyuniquelyinordertocomputetheimpulsere-
sponses pertaining to a government consumption shock. Moreover, given (9),





Let, for notational convenience, the vector of the VAR variables be re-written as:
	 ZG M X tt t t 
 ,, (11)
wheret includesall variablesapart from governmentconsumptionand the moneysupply. In this con-
text, our identification strategy imposes not only that condition (10) be satisfied but also the following








































































where A0 is partitioned conformably with Zt in (11). The first row of A0 reflects the assumption that gov-
ernment consumption is predetermined with respect to all other variables in the VAR. The second row
reflects the assumption that the money supply is predetermined with respect to all other variables but
governmentconsumption.The absenceof restrictions on the elements of the third rowis just reflecting
that we are not imposing any structure on the coefficients of the last six equations of our VAR. This
means that the elements of the third rowin (12) are not identified. That, however, does not constitute a
problem for our purposes because the block-recursiveness implied by our identification strategy is
enough to uniquelypin downthe dynamic responses of all the variables to a government consumption
shock.
It can be shown without any loss of generality that, first, the dynamic responses of the variables in
Zt are uniquely identified if one adopts the normalization that A0 is lower-triangularwith positive diago-
nal elements and, second, that adopting that normalization, the dynamicresponses are invariant to an
arbitrary change in the ordering of the variables in t.This implies that we can uniquely identify the im-
pulse responses pertaining to a government consumption shock by setting A0 equal to the inverse of
the Choleski factor of theV matrix, withoutworryingabout the order in whichthe variables in t appear
in the reduced-form VAR.
APPENDIX 2
Here we present in detail the simple model economy that we use, similar in structure to Christiano,
Eichenbaum and Evans (1995), which is able to replicate the main features of the data. The economy
consists of a representative household, a representative firm, a representative financial intermediary
and a government. There are shocks in the economy. The history of these shocks up to period t, is the
state of the economy in periodt. All variables are indexed to the state of the economy, but to simplify
notation we do not do it explicitly. An equilibrium in this economy is a sequence of policy variables,
quantities and prices such that firms, financial intermediaries and households solve their problems
given the sequenceof policyvariables and prices, the budget constraints of the government and of the
central bank are satisfied and markets clear.
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11• Government and Central Bank:
The government gets revenues from lump-sum taxesTt, makes government consumptionGt and sup-
plies moneyMt
s. Government consumptionis a random variable. Since there are lump-sum taxes gov-
ernment debt plays no role. Taxes are an endogenous variable.
The central bank makes a lump-sum monetary transferKt to the representative financial intermediary




t  1 . The central bank re-
acts to the government consumption shock. Positive innovations in public consumption are met with




to the firms. The gross nominal interest rate on the deposits and on the loans to the firm isRt. The fi-
nancial intermediary receives from the monetary authority the transfer of moneyKt. In order to maxi-




The preferences of the representative household are described by the expected utility function:













1  , (13)
where is a discount factor,Ct is consumption,1Nt is leisure andNt is hours of work.
The good market is open at the beginning of each period and the asset market at the end of each pe-
riod. At the endof periodt 1the householdis in the asset market withwealthWt1, part of it he decides
to maintain as cash to carry out transactions in periodt, Mt
h, and the remaining,Lt, he decides to de-
posit at the intermediary. Thus,
LM tt
h
t (  W 1 (14)
The householdstartsperiodt withoutstandingmoneybalances,Mt
h, andoutstandingdepositsatthefi-
nancial intermediary, Lt. The household receives the labor income,WN tt , whereWt is the wage rate.
The labor income is paid in advance and can be used to purchase consumption in the same period.
The purchases of consumption goods are such that,
PC M WN tT t
h
tt ( . (15)
At the end of the period, the household receives the gross returns on the loansRL tt and pays taxesTt.
Thus the cash holdings for the household at periodt are
Wtt
h
tt tt t t t M W NP CTR L     (16)
The representative householdmaximizes (13) subject to (14), (15), (16) and the requirement that port-
folios must be chosen one period in advance.
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The first condition is the standard intratemporal condition in expectedvalue, since the householdmust
decide his portfolio in advance. The second condition is the standard intertemporal condition between
two consecutive leisure levels.
￿ Firms:
The problem of the representative firm is to choose production in order to maximize profits. The profits
are,
 )tt tt t t t
f PY Wn R M   1 ,
whereYt is production andnt is hours of labor employed. The firm solves the problem
max)t
subject to the linear technology
YA n tt t ( ,
where At is the level of technology, and subject to the cash-in-advance restriction
Wn M tt t
f (











The clearing conditions for the deposits, good, labor and money markets are:
LKMW n tt t
f
tt  









￿ Interest rate and money relationship:
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goes down. Thus, KT must go up
since MT
h andLT were chosen in advance.
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